


SECRET



Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004900130002-5

OCI No. 0300/65A


Copy No. 52

SPECIAL REPORT

FRANCE'S CHANGING RELATIONS WITH ITS FORMER AFRICAN TERRITORIES

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

25X1



SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004900130002-5 Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004900130002-5

Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004900130002-5

SECRET

FRANCE'S CHANGING RELATIONS WITH ITS FORMER AFRICAN TERRITORIES

The military, economic, and political ties which bind France to its former African territories have gradually been altered in the past two years. Bit by bit France has reduced total development aid, replaced bilateral preferential trading arrangements with multilateral EEC ties, and withdrawn troops from Africa. Except where its own interest is involved, Paris has tended to shy away from direct involvement.

France appears to reason that only by reducing and recasting its role in ex-French Africa can it hope to wield any appreciable influence there in years to come. By relinquishing certain aspects of its former position, France probably hopes to exploit its "third world" role, offering the African states an attractive alternative to attachment to either the US or the USSR.

Since France has reduced its presence, the sharp anti-French flare-ups are less frequent than last year. Reduced dependence on France, however, probably will lead increasingly to the broadening of political and economic ties with other countries. This development, coupled with the gradual assumption of power by younger leaders whose ties to France are minimal, would undercut France's ability to retain a privileged position.

Early Postindependence Years

The military, economic, and cultural accords which the former French territories signed either prior to or shortly after they gained formal independence in 1960 preserved almost intact all but the political ties of the colonial period. France continued to provide large amounts of public and private assistance in the form of grants, loans, budgetary subsidies, and technical aid. Preferential trading arrangements, price supports, and membership in the franc zone further bound these newly in-

dependent states to France. In addition, Paris trained their national armies and police, maintained large contingents of French troops under agreements providing for collaboration in defense matters.

To round out the picture of a pervasive French presence, French was the official language, Frenchmen predominated as instructors in schools following a French system of education, French businessmen controlled important elements of

25X1
25X1


SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004900130002-5
SECRET
 French Economic Assistance and Troop Strength in Africa

OFFICIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE* (Est. in millions of US dollars)	TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PERSONNEL		NUMBER OF FRENCH TROOPS		DEMobilized AFRICAN TROOPS
1963**	1964		1964	JULY 1965	
34.0	950	CAMEROON	1,000	300	Probably none
17.0	600	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	1,300	(Small group from Chad)	904
20.0	464	CHAD	3,000	1,000	2,500
18.0	600	CONGO (Brazzaville)	1,700	None	1,000
17.0	250	DAHOMEY	900	None	740
11.0	400	GABON	350	300	Probably none
25.0	1,500	IVORY COAST	1,200	600	750
46.0	1,726	MALAGASY REPUBLIC	7,400	2,850	1,200
32.0	230	MAURITANIA	2,500	300	800
13.0	400	NIGER	1,500	250	255
32.0	1,500	SENEGAL	7,900	1,600	900
5.5	127	TOGO	(Small administrative detachments for military aid)	None	100
9.0	400	UPPER VOLTA		None	1,175
259.5	9,147	Total	28,750	7,200	10,524

* Includes country projects, regional activities, teachers, technicians and administrative personnel of France's aid agency (FAC); support grants from other ministries; loans; and prorated "general assistance".

** A country-by-country breakdown for subsequent years is not available. However, French budget estimates for economic, military and administrative expenditures for 1964 are approximately \$265.3 million and \$227.3 million for 1965.



SECRET

commercial life in most of the countries, and local leaders were often French trained.

In 1963 and 1964, however, France increasingly came under attack for its "neocolonial" role, and in several states, such as Dahomey and Congo (Brazzaville), revolutionary regimes emerged which were appreciably less French oriented than their predecessors. Even such conservative states as Chad and Upper Volta waged sharp anti-French campaigns. These outbreaks caused no major shift in French policy, but they did accelerate the inevitable evolution.

Gradual Reduction of French Presence

The 1963 Jeanneney Report on foreign aid was the first major indication of a new French posture toward Africa. In drawing a blueprint for over-all French aid policy, it served as a declaration that French-speaking Africa could expect proportionately less of the total. Annual official bilateral aid to the former colonies has since dropped more than \$100 million, and French officials indicate that it will be maintained at this reduced level. In addition, budgetary subsidies have been virtually eliminated; only one or two of the states still receive such help, and that is being phased out.

Bilateral trade on a privileged basis between France and its former colonies is still extensive, but some of it is being

transferred to the multilateral context of the EEC. All of the countries of former French Black Africa except Guinea are associated with the Common Market, which gives them significant trade and aid benefits. Under the Association Convention, ratified in 1964, certain of their basic products are admitted to the European Community without customs duty or charges. Other African exports will benefit from the progressive abolition of duties within the community.

The bulk of the \$800 million in assistance to be provided by the EEC over a five-year period to all the countries and territories associated with it will flow to France's former territories. In addition, to ease the African states' passage from French protection to world competition, France's EEC partners agreed to share part of the burden of paying subsidies on certain African products.

In mid-1964, Paris began a phased withdrawal of most of its remaining 28,750 troops in sub-Saharan Africa. By 1 July 1965, only 7,200 remained, and these were located primarily at major bases in four of the countries. Future reductions will bring the total down to 6,600 men. While African chiefs of states were assured that France intends to honor its defense commitments by the use of mobile forces based in France, the military withdrawals have had a considerable economic impact. The loss of direct economic benefits accruing from the presence of the troops and their dependents has been estimated

SECRET

SECRET

at about \$70 million per year. In addition, political instability could well increase as African leaders are forced to rely on their own small and generally unreliable armies for internal security.

Since early 1963 Paris has shown a greater readiness to accept more independent political conduct on the part of its former colonies. In particular it has been less willing to support regimes which have clearly lost popular approval. Its intervention in Gabon in 1964 illustrated the unsatisfactory nature of an "imposed" solution, and the current trend seems to favor lesser French involvement in domestic day-to-day politics. Paris' relatively detached stance during the current period of Dahomean political "infighting" and its willingness to live with the present regime in Brazzaville are in line with this policy.

De Gaulle himself still seems to take pride in the "father-son" relationship he believes he has established with some of the African leaders and to welcome the opportunity to demonstrate France's successful decolonization at frequent ceremonial events.

Relations With Individual Countries

The climate of relations in 1965 between France and most of its African protégés has been good, despite occasional jarring incidents. Relations with Senegal, Togo, the Ivory Coast, and the Malagasy Republic have been

excellent, and these states on occasion have publicly praised France's "enlightened" African policy.

Even in the Brazzaville Congo, whose developing relations with the Communists caused great concern in Western circles, relations with France have been much improved since last year. In this case, France's delay on 1965 aid and technical assistance negotiations and its hard bargaining on the disposal of military stocks induced Brazzaville to adopt a more conciliatory stance.

Gabon, the scene of an active military intervention by France in 1964, remains a thorn in the French side. Although President M'ba continues a repressive policy repugnant to the great majority of both French and Gabonese, Paris thus far has limited itself to demanding certain changes and reforms in his government. The French also are attempting to maintain contacts with opposition elements.

Guinea, outside the French fold since 1958, has recently resolved its long-standing financial problems with Paris. The way now could be opened for private investment and France would probably provide technical assistance if asked. The French role in Guinea presently is limited to some 230 teachers paid by Guinea.

Mali, another recalcitrant, also has indicated its interest in reopening ties with Paris, which has followed a "hands-off"

SECRET

SECRET

policy for several years. Negotiations undertaken in February on Mali's economic and financial problems failed because of its refusal to subscribe to the rigorous economic discipline on which the French are insisting. There have been some recent indications, however, that new negotiations may be opened.

A further development pleasing to France was the formation in February 1965 of the African and Malagasy Common Organization (OCAM) by all of its former territories except Guinea and Mali. Paris saw OCAM, the third organizational grouping of these territories since 1960, as a vehicle for preserving a French-oriented bloc in African circles and as a potential instrument for combating subversion and ensuring stability. Mauritania's subsequent withdrawal and the opposition of the Brazzaville Congo--and to some extent of Cameroon--reflect the stresses in the organization, and French officials apparently believe now that its usefulness is limited.

Outlook

Most of France's former territories are beset with problems ranging from political instability and unassimilated youth to economic underdevelopment and the chronic psychoses among leaders about internal

security and foreign plots. The present leaders of these states appear to realize that good relations with France are necessary if these problems are to be resolved. With France in the process of reducing its direct involvement, however, the need to come to grips with such problems probably will cause African leaders increasingly to turn to other countries for aid. The rise of "second-generation" leaders, whose psychological distance from France is great and whose nationalism is strong, will accelerate the process of disengagement.

Under these conditions France may find it difficult to retain a dominant role in its former African states. In many ways France has demonstrated that it is reconciled to a diminished role and the French public, for the most part, would welcome a lifting of part of the economic burden that the aid program entails. Nevertheless, De Gaulle is likely to try to hold on to the essence of France's relationship with its former territories. One of his major weapons in this struggle to retain influence is a continuing effort to cast France in the posture of a third alternative open to the Africans--an alternative that will not involve the risks of association with either the US or the Communist world.

25X1

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004900130002-5

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004900130002-5